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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTFS AND COMMENTS

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Federal Rules Do Not Entitle Defendant to
Pre-Trial Inspection of Statement Made to
Investigator-Defendant was indicted for the
illegal sale of narcotics. In advance of trial in a
federal district court, defendant made a motion
under rules 16 and 17(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to permit the inspection
and copying of an oral statement made by
defendant in response to questions propounded
by an attorney for the prosecution. While the
statement was reduced to writing, it was not
signed and, according to a government affidavit,
did not contain a confession of guilt. The motion
was supported by affidavits of defendant
which alleged that he could not recall the statement word for word and that a copy was essential to the preparation of the *defense.Rule 16
provides that, upon motion by defendant before
trial, the court may order the prosecution to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy books,
papers, documents, or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others by seizure or by process,
upon a showing that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. Rule 17(c)
authorizes the court to issue, in advance of
trial, a subpoena duces tecum for designated
books, papers, etc. in possession of the prosecution and sought for use as evidence by
defendant. The trial court denied defendant's
motion on the grounds that neither of the above
rules was designed to require pre-trial disclosure of defendant's statements or confessions.
United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
The decision was based largely on an interpretation of the legislative history of the rules.
Rule 16, the court concluded, was not intended
to afford the defendant an unlimited right of
discovery and inspection, but, on the contrary,
the rule was a restatement of the pre-existing
common-law procedure which did not permit
such discovery in criminal cases. The rule appeared to the court to have been directed at the
case where large numbers of documents had
been seized by the prosecution and which were

necessary for the preparation of defendant's
case. In addition, the court expressed doubt
that an oral statement qualifies as "books,
papers... obtained from or belonging to defendant", but stated that, even if the statement
were deemed to be within that language, the
defendant's request in the present case failed
to fulfill the statutory requirements of materiality and reasonableness. The fact that the
statement was unsigned was not considered
material; defendant's signature, the court said,
would not bring the statement within the scope
of the rule.
The court interpreted rule 17(c) as adding
nothing to the traditional type of trial subpoena, other than making it, for purposes of
convenience, returnable prior to the trial. The
purpose of 17(c), the court said, is not to allow
discovery in addition to that permissible under
rule 16 but is to be used merely to facilitate the
securing of documents which are to be used as
evidence by defendant at the trial. The rule
may not be used, it was stated, to help the defendant recall his prior statements so that he
may not be impeached at the trial. The court
discussed at length the policy arguments involved in interpreting pre-trial disclosure rules
and concluded that such arguments should
properly be considered only by the legislature.
The only reported case found by the court to
grant pre-trial inspection under Rules 16 and
17(c) by defendant of his unsigned statements
was United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). The Peltz ruling was subsequently followed in United States v. Hall, 18
F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
n Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49
(D. C. Cir. 1956), it was held that Minifon wire
recordings of incriminating telephone conversations had by defendant with a government
investigator would not qualify for discovery
under rule 16. The recordings were considered
by the court as analogous to copies of confessions made by defendants to police officers.
However, the court indicated that the trial
judge, in his discretion, could order discovery
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of such recordings, if sought by the defendant
for use as evidence, under rule 17(c).
Confessions Obtained During Delay in
Arraignment Are Not Automatically Inadmissible in a Federal Court-After her arrest on a
charge of the malicious burning of another's
property, the defendant was subjected to a two
hour interrogation by police officers before being
arraigned before a magistrate. During the interrogation, police informed defendant that she
did not have to make a statement and that any
statement made might be used against her.
Nevertheless, the defendant prepared and
signed a written confession. At the trial in a
federal district court, defendant objected to the
introduction of the confession on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of rule 5(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
requires that an arrested person be taken before
the nearest available commissioner "without
unnecessary delay." The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, with one
member dissenting, affirmed defendant's conviction and approved the admission of the
statement. Tillotson v. United States, 231 F.2d
736 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
In support of her contention, defendant relied on the majority opinion in Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U. S. 410, in which the Court
said at page 413: ". . . a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to
failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a
committing magistrate." The court, however,
considered the Upsaw case to be a restatement
of the rule set forth in McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1948) which held inadmissible
confessions obtained during "inexcusable detention" by "continuous questioning for many
hours under psychological pressure." The exclusions of the statements in both the McNabb
and Upshaw cases, the court said, were based
on findings that the confessions were the
"fruits of wrongdoing" and that the accused
was illegally detained for the very purpose of
securing the confessions. The present case, the
court stated, did not involve such a situation.
To render a confession inadmissible as the
product of a law violation, it was said, the delay in arraignment must be unreasonable, and,
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in addition, questioning must be continuous
and of such a coercive nature as to indicate that
the statement was not the "offspring of reasoned
choice." Affording the arresting officers a reasonable opportunity to question defendants
prior to their arraignment, the court concluded,
will not constitute such an "unnecessary delay"
as to violate rule 5(a).
When Is a Declaration Spontaneous?Lampe and O'Bryan were jointly indicted for
the murder of one Lamar. The two defendants
and Lamar had been engaged in a prolonged
drinking bout and, as the outcome of a dispute
over Lamar's failure to contribute to the liquor
fund, defendants assaulted their companion.
Upon regaining consciousness, Lamar left the
scene. When found elsewhere by the police,
Lamar told the officers that he had been beaten
by the defendants. Lamar was then taken to
police headquarters where he made a second
statement to the effect that both defendants
had taken part in the assault. Subsequently,
Lamar was removedto a hospital where he made
a third statement to an officer to the effect that
only one of the defendants was responsible for
the assault. Following Lamar's death, one day
later, defendants admitted the assault. Lampe's
confession admitted that he had administered
the major part of the beating, while O'Bryan's
statement sought to minimize his own part in
the crime. The trial court admitted into evidence, over defendants' objection, the testimony of the police officers as to the three statements made to them by the victim Lamar. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the conviction of defendant
Lampe and the admission into evidence of the
three declarations by the victim. Lampe v.
United States, 229 F.2d 43 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
In regard to the first statement made by
Lamar shortly after being found by the police,
the court observed that while ". . . the place
referred to was several blocks away, it seems
clear that the officer to whom this statement
was made was the first person with whom
Lamar spoke after becoming conscious and
moving away from the scene of the attack in a
fatally wounded, dazed and ecessively shocked
condition." The court found that the second
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declaration, made by Lamar at police headquarters, qualified as spontaneous because
"there had been no opportunity for reflection.
Lamar had had no medical attention and must
have been suffering from his grievous wounds
even more than when he first talked to the
police." However, even if the second statement
were not considered spontaneous, the court
said, its admission was not prejudicial to defendants since it added nothing to Lamar's first
statement. The court considered the third
st ement, made at the hospital, to be inadmissibl6 since ". . . the contents of the remarks
were not due to physical shock or nervous excitement that had stilled the reflective faculties
and removed their control, and therefore
deemed so trustworthy as to be admissible
even though brought into the trial by hearsay
evidehce." Nevertheless, admission of the
third declaration was not considered prejudicial because it merely confirmed facts which
were admitted by defendant Lampe's confession.
Use of Wire Tap Recordings to Refresh
Memory of Witness Does Not Render Testimony Inadmissible in a Federal Court-In the
course of an investigation of the defendant's
attempt to bribe police officers, an investigator
recorded a telephone conversation between
himself and the defendant. The recording was
made through the use of an induction coil apparatus attached to the telephone receiver and
connected to a Minifon recording device. At the
trial, before stating his own recollection of the
'recorded telephone conversation, the investigator refreshed his memory by playing the
recording. The Federal Communications Act,
48 STAT. 1103-4 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952)
provides, in part, that no person shall divulge
the existence or contents of an intercepted communication or use information contained
therein for his own ben6fit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the use of the recording to refresh the
recollection of the witness, who was also the
recipient of the telephone call, did not render

the testimony about the conversation inadmissible. Monroe -v. United States, 234 F.2d 49
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
The court avoided the question as to whether
this type of recording constituted an interception within the meaning of the statute and
stated that, in any case, "Lt. Thoman's testimony was not the product of an illegal interception; he repeated on the stand what he
himself had heard."
It is Improper to Cross-Examine Defendant
Concerning Past Convictions even though Defense Fails to Make Timely Objection-The
defendant was convicted of armed robbery and
larceny of a motor vehicle. Upon cross-examination the state's attorney asked the defendant
whether he had ever been convicted of a felony.
After the defendant had given an affirmative
response, his counsel objected to the question
and the objection was overruled. The prosecutor then proceeded to question the defendant
concerning the previous felony. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the admission of this
evidence was incompetent and prejudicial. The
Supreme Court of Illinois accepted this argument and remanded the cause for new trial.
People v. Flynn, 133 N.E.2d 257 (fll. 1956).
The State did not contend that it was proper
to question the defendant about past convictions but claimed that the incompetency of the
testimony was waived through the lack of
timely objection to the question. Lack of
prompt objection, the court indicated, will not
excuse the introduction of such prejudicial information. The Court said that it is improper
to cross-examine a defendant concerning prior
convictions, because "... there is no question
more damaging to a defendant with a jury than
one which suggests or intimates that he is a
criminal or has been charged with criminal
offenses." Prior convictions can be used only
to affect the defendant's credibility as a witness
and must be introduced by the offer of the record of the prior conviction or a certified copy
thereof.
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